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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - PERSONS ENTITLED To RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL 
QUESTIONS - STANDING To SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT - Federal officers arrested petitioner upon finding nar-
cotics in an awning outside the window of E's apartment which petitioner was 
using as "a friend" of E. Charged with possession of contraband narcotics, 
petitioner moved to suppress the evidence claiming the warrant to search the 
apartment was issued to the officers without probable cause. The district 
court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that he lacked standing to 
make it. At trial a renewed motion to suppress was denied, and on appeal 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia1 affirmed the ruling of 
the district court.2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
vacated and remanded, one Justice dissenting.3 Whenever illegal possession 
is the basis for conviction, a defendant has sufficient standing to challenge 
the legality of the search or seizure by which the evidence of illegal possession 
was obtained. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 
Prior to the principal case, standing in the federal courts to petition for 
the suppression of evidence obtained by illegal search or seizure was avail-
able only to parties who could show a proprietary or possessory interest in 
the property alleged to have been unlawfully searched or seized.4 This re-
quirement of "standing," or qualifying as the "person aggrieved,'' has re-
stricted5 the availability of the motion to suppress illegally-obtained evidence 
in the federal courts with varied and often unusual results. There has 
never been any doubt that ownership or right to possession qualifies as a 
sufficient quantum of interest in the property searched or seized to provide 
standing, but as the quantum of such interest decreases, the problem in-
creases in difficulty.6 For example, it has generally been held that employees 
do not have standing to suppress evidence obtained by illegal search or 
seizure of the employer's property,7 but where a desk was assigned exclusively 
to the defendant, it was held she had the requisite standing.8 And where cor-
1 Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1958). 
2 Petitioner was convicted of violating Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act § 2 (c), 
35 Stat. 614 (1914), 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1958) (unlawful to facilitate the concealment and 
sale of narcotics imported illegally into the United States) and INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, 
§ 4704 (a) (unlawful to purchase, sell, dispense, or distribute narcotics except in original 
stamped package). 
3 Justice Douglas joined the Court in the part of the opinion which deals with 
"standing," but dissented from the ruling that there was probable cause for issuing the 
search warrant based on hearsay. This note is concerned only with "standing." 
4 Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946). 
5 Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Amendment, 14 So. CAL. L. R.Ev. 359 (1941). 
6 E.g., Gibson v. United States, 149 F.2d 381 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (guest did not have 
standing); Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1940) (lessee had standing but 
defendant did not have standing where it was codefendant's rights which had been in-
vaded). Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1931) (trespasser did not have stand-
ing but tenant at sufferance had standing); Graham v. United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir, 
1926) (son of owner did not have standing). But see McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 
451 (1948) (denial of accused's motion to suppress was prejudicial as well to codefendant). 
7 Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932). 
s United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
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porate papers were illegally seized, the corporation could suppress,9 but the 
president10 or sole stockholder11 could not. A peculiar situation is created 
when the accused must claim the property in order to suppress, but pos-
session alone is enough to convict. The defendant has to "choose one horn 
of the dilemma."12 In such situations, the courts have held that "one could 
have sufficient custody and control as to warrant conviction of unlawful 
possession ... and yet not have sufficient interest therein to entitle him 
to raise the question of unlawful search and seizure."13 In the principal 
case, the Court solved the dilemma by holding that where possession is the 
basis for conviction, such possession alone gives the defendant standing. 
The Court went on, however, and stated as a second ground for standing, 
that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge 
its legality. Thus, the principal case substantially departs from the course 
followed in the lower federal courts by assuring standing to many persons 
not previously held to be in the category of "persons aggrieved." 
The fourth amendment provides for "the right of the people to be secure 
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures .... " The exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the 
fourth amendment has been adopted by the federal courts14 as the best 
means for giving effect to rights under this amendment.15 Accordingly, it 
is suggested that fourth amendment rights would be afforded the greatest 
protection under a rule which excludes any evidence illegally obtained 
whether or not it violated the particular objecting defendant's constitutional 
rights. The abolition in this circumstance of the standing requirement 
would prevent law enforcement officers from trading the release of the one 
criminal who could challenge the evidence for the conviction of others by 
use of illegally-obtained evidence. The courts would no longer make 
profitable this violation of the rights of third parties by admitting the fruits 
of the violation. California has already taken this position16 with success-
ful results.I 7 
ll Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
10 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946). 
l1 United States v. Hoyt, 53 F.2d 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
12This is Judge Learned Hand's famous dilemma, Connolly v. Medalie, supra note 7, 
at 630. It has been suggested that such a choice should be unconstitutional. See Edwards, 
Standing To Suppress Unreasonably Seized Evidence, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 471,491 (1952). 
1s Kelley v. United States, 61 F.2d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 1932). 
14 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
15 Those who support other remedies for controlling unreasonable searches and 
seizures may well heed the following lament of Justice Traynor quoted from People v. 
Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 447, 282 P.2d 905 (1955): "Experience has demonstrated, however, 
that neither administrative, criminal, nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless 
searches and seizures." 
10 "Since all of the reasons that compelled us to adopt the exclusionary rule are 
applicable whenever evidence is obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees, such 
evidence is inadmissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the particular 
defendant's rights." People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 761, 290 P .2d 855 (1955). 
17 Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 515, 538 (1957). 
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One obstacle to the adoption of such a rule by the federal courts would 
be the self-imposed rule of the federal courts against allowing a person to 
invoke the constitutional rights of another. But there is respectable prec-
edent allowing such vicarious assertion of constitutional rights where 
strong reasons are present. In Barrows v. Jackson18 it was held the defendant 
had standing to raise the defense that court enforcement of a real estate 
covenant directed against non-Caucasians violated the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment although the defendant was not a mem-
ber of the groups discriminated against. The Court declared: "Under the 
peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which underlie our 
rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which is only a rule of prac-
tice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which 
would be denied by permitting the damages action to be maintained."19 
Indeed, under the principal case, to allow anyone legitimately on the 
premises to challenge the legality of the search is, in truth, to allow a third 
party to assert the rights of the owner. Another, and perhaps more com-
pelling, objection is that the need for ascertaining the truth at a trial out-
weighs the need for allowing the accused to suppress evidence obtained in 
violation of the constitutional rights of a third party.20 But implicit in this 
objection is the assumption that use of illegal evidence is necessary to un-
cover the truth at a trial. There is, however, an alternative to the use of 
illegally-obtained evidence to ascertain the truth, and that is, simply, to 
obtain the evidence legally. Adherence to the rules prescribed by society 
should not present an insurmountable obstacle to the operations of law 
enforcement agencies. The truth can be established and convictions secured 
either by legally or illegally-obtained evidence, but those convictions secured 
by the use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment should 
be invalidated "because they encourage the kind of society that is obnoxious 
to free men. "21 
William R. Nicholas 
18 346 U.S. 249 (1953). See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Anti-Fascist 
C.Omm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
19 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). 
20 :r,fcCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 447 
(1938); Comment, 55 MICH. L. REv. 567 (1957). 
21 Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the C.Ourt in Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 
62, 65 (1954). 
